







work that assumes limited nominal price adjustment, “sticky prices”
for short. At the heart of much of this analysis is a so-called New Keyne-
sian (NK) “expectational” Phillips curve that relates current inﬂation, πt,t o
expected future inﬂation and the deviation of marginal cost from trend ˆ st:
πt = βEtπt+1 + ξˆ st, (1)
with β, ξ>0. Empirical estimates of the coefﬁcient on the marginal cost
term, ξ, in this NK Phillips curve tend to be positive but small in absolute
value, e.g., Sbordone (2002) and Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999).1 This represents a
problem for the sticky-price framework since the coefﬁcient ξ is directly re-
lated to the frequency with which nominal prices are assumed to be adjusted:
the coefﬁcient is smaller the less frequently prices are adjusted. Within stan-
dard sticky-price models, estimated values of ξ imply that prices are adjusted
less than once per year. This macro estimate of price stickiness is implau-
sibly high from the perspective of the micro estimates surveyed in Wolman
(forthcoming).
It has been conjectured widely that nominal rigidities, such as sticky
prices, have more persistent real effects if they interact with real rigidities.
For example, the basic NK Phillips curve (1) has been derived for an environ-
mentwithnominalfrictions,butessentiallynorealrigidities: ﬁrmsrentfactors
For helpful comments we would like to thank Andrew Foerster, Bob Hetzel, Ned Prescott, and
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1 Expression (1) is derived in Woodford (2003, ch. 3) for an economy with Calvo-type sticky
prices. Woodford’s (2003) textbook presents a uniﬁed framework for thinking about monetary policy
based on sticky-price models. For a critical review of this line of research, see Green (2005).
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of production—capital and labor—in frictionless markets. Now, suppose that
there is a real rigidity in addition to the sticky prices. In particular, assume
that capital is speciﬁc to individual ﬁrms, and it is costly for these ﬁrms to
adjust their capital stock. Introducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital adjustment costs
into sticky-price models substantially complicates the analysis, yetWoodford
(2005) manages to derive an almost closed-form solution to this problem. In
particular, Woodford (2005) again derives an NK Phillips curve of the form
(1), but now the marginal cost coefﬁcient, ξ, depends not only on the extent
of price stickiness, but also on the magnitude of capital adjustment costs: the
coefﬁcientissmallerthelessfrequentlypricesareadjustedandthemorecostly
it is to adjust capital. Thus low estimated values of ξ do not necessarily imply
a high degree of price stickiness.
Woodford’s (2005) clean analytical solution of the modiﬁed NK Phillips
curve does come with a cost. His approach is based on the linear approxi-
mation of an economy with Calvo-type nominal price adjustment around an
equilibriumwithzeroaverageinﬂation. Theassumptionofzeroaverageinﬂa-
tion makes the theoretical analysis of the ﬁrm aggregation problem possible,
yet it is not empirically plausible. Even though in recent years inﬂation has
been remarkably stable in many industrialized countries, average inﬂation has
been positive. Furthermore, most estimates of the NK Phillips curve use data
from periods of moderate inﬂation. Thus, it is important to know whether the
behavior of these models is sensitive to the steady-state inﬂation rate.2
In this article we evaluate the relative impact of positive average inﬂation
versus zero inﬂation in an economy with nominal rigidities and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital adjustment costs. Unlike Woodford (2005), we model nominal rigidi-
ties as Taylor-type staggered price adjustment, and not as Calvo-type proba-
bilistic price adjustment. This approach is necessary since at this time there
arenoaggregationresultsforoureconomicenvironmentwithCalvo-typepric-
ing and nonzero average inﬂation. We show that for small values of positive
average inﬂation, the Taylor principle, which states that a central bank should
increase the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one in response to a de-
viation of inﬂation from its target, is no longer sufﬁcient to guarantee that
monetary policy does not become a source of unnecessary ﬂuctuations in our
economy.
The fundamental difﬁculty with incorporating ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital into a
model with sticky prices is that ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital can amplify the hetero-
geneity associated with price stickiness. With Calvo price setting, ﬁrms face
a constant exogenous probability of being able to readjust their price. If there
2 Furthermore, even though overall inﬂation has been low and stable, trends have remained in
disaggregated measures of prices—for example, services prices have a positive trend and durable
goods prices have a negative trend. This means that in a multi-sector model with zero inﬂation, the
steady state would involve trends in individual nominal prices and thus a nondegenerate distribution
of prices across sticky-price ﬁrms (Wolman 2004).A. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 59
are no state variables speciﬁc to the ﬁrm (other than price), then all ﬁrms that
adjust in a given period choose the same price. In that case, even though the
true distribution of prices is inﬁnite, it is possible to summarize the relevant
distribution with just a small number of state variables.3 If instead capital is
ﬁrm speciﬁc, ﬁrms that adjust in the same period generally do not have the
samecapitalstock. Theirmarginalcostisnotthesame,andingeneraltheywill
not choose the same price. Thus, combining Calvo pricing and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital appears to lead to an intractable model.
Themodelisintractableinitsexactform,butSveenandWeinke(2004)and
Woodford (2005) have shown how to derive a tractable linear approximation
to the model, under the assumption that the average inﬂation rate is zero. The
key to these derivations is the fact that in the zero-inﬂation steady state there
is no heterogeneity: all ﬁrms charge the same price.
Giventhetractabilityproblem,thereislittlehopeofbeingabletolearnhow
the Calvo model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital behaves away from a zero-inﬂation
steady state. Fortunately, there is another class of sticky-price models that
remains tractable when combined with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. The staggered
pricing framework associated with Taylor (1980) assumes that there are J
differenttypesofﬁrms;eachperiodafraction1/J ofﬁrmsadjuststheirprices,
and their prices remain ﬁxed for J periods. Firm-speciﬁc capital presents no
problems in the Taylor model, because it remains the case that all ﬁrms that
adjust in a given period enter with the same capital stock and thus will choose
the same price.
We solve the linear approximation to the Taylor model numerically and
ask whether the model’s dynamics are sensitive to the steady-state inﬂation
ratearoundwhichwelinearize.4 Weﬁndthatasmallbutpositiveinﬂationrate
can have a big impact on the set of parameters for monetary policy rules and
investment adjustment costs for which a rational expectations (RE) equilib-
rium is unique.5 If the equilibrium is not unique, that is, there is equilibrium
indeterminacy, thenpossibleequilibriumoutcomescandependonshocksthat
do not constrain the resource feasible allocations in an economy. In these
equilibria self-fulﬁlling expectations that coordinate on such nonfundamen-
tal shocks, known as “sunspots,” introduce unnecessary ﬂuctuations into the
economy.
3 We say the true distribution is inﬁnite because a positive fraction of ﬁrms charges a price
set arbitrarily many periods in the past.
4 Others have worked with the Taylor model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital; see, for
example, Coenen and Levin (2004) and de Walque, Smets, and Wouters (2004). They have not
studied the role of steady-state inﬂation.
5 Since we are studying linear approximations of equilibria, all of our statements have to be
understood as applying to local properties of the equilibria for small deviations from the steady
state. Wolman and Couper (2003) discuss the potential pitfalls of this type of analysis, especially
as it relates to statements about the uniqueness of equilibrium.60 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
In standard sticky-price models, monetary policy rules that set the nom-
inal interest rate in response to deviations of inﬂation from its target value
achieve a unique RE equilibrium, if they follow the Taylor principle. The
principle states that the nominal interest rates increase more than one-for-one
with an increase of the inﬂation rate. This policy response does not have to
be very big, as long as it is greater than one. We show that in the sticky-price
model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, positive steady-state inﬂation generally in-
creases the region of the parameter space for which there is indeterminacy
of equilibrium. In other words, for the same magnitudes of price-stickiness
and capital-adjustment costs, monetary policy has to be much more respon-
sive to deviations of inﬂation from its target in order to maintain a unique RE
equilibrium outcome. These results suggest that it may be misleading to in-
terpret history and make policy recommendations based on ﬁndings from the
zero steady-state inﬂation case. Our results complement those in Sveen and
Weinke (2005), who show that moving from a rental market to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital leads to a larger region of the parameter space for which there is inde-
terminacy of equilibrium when steady-state inﬂation is zero.
In Section 1 we describe the economy with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital adjust-
ment cost and the two types of sticky prices: Calvo-type and Taylor-type
nominal price setting. In Section 2 we outline how Woodford (2005) solves
the aggregation problem for Calvo-type pricing and derives the modiﬁed NK
Phillips curve. In Section 3 we characterize the economy with Taylor-type
pricing, and in Section 4 we study the impact of capital adjustment costs and
nonzero average inﬂation on the economy with Taylor-type pricing.
1. STICKY-PRICE MODELS WITH FIRM-SPECIFIC CAPITAL
This section presents the common features of Calvo and Taylor sticky-price
models. There is an inﬁnitely lived representative household and a continuum
of differentiated ﬁrms. The ﬁrms act as monopolistic competitors in their
differentiated output markets, but they are competitive in their differentiated
labormarkets. Thedifferentiatedoutputgoodsoftheﬁrmsareusedtoproduce
an aggregate output good in a competitive market. The aggregate output good
can be used for consumption or investment. Firms use investment goods
to augment their ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital stocks, subject to capital adjustment
costs. Firms set the nominal price of their differentiated output good, and
only infrequently do they have the opportunity to adjust their nominal price.
The Representative Household
The household values consumption, ct, and experiences disutility from the
supply of differentiated labor to a continuum of markets, ht (j). The expectedA. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 61


















with discount factor, β. Period utility is an increasing (decreasing) concave
(convex) function of consumption (work time), σ,ν,γ > 0. The represen-
tative household owns shares in the continuum of ﬁrms and holds nominal











[Qt (j) + Dt (j)]at (j)dj + (1 + it)Bt, (3)
where Pt is the nominal price of the aggregate output good, Qt (j) is the
nominal price of a share in ﬁrm j, Wt (j) is the nominal wage paid by ﬁrm j,
Dt (j) is the nominal dividend paid by ﬁrm j, it is the nominal interest rate on
nominal bond holdings Bt, and at (j) is the household’s ﬁrm-share holdings.
Optimal choice of work effort implies the following ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor
supply functions
wt (j) = γh t (j)
ν /λt, (4)




Optimal asset and bond holdings imply the following Euler equations for






















The representative household chooses consumption such that the household is
indifferent between consuming slightly more, with a corresponding reduction
in asset holdings, and consuming slightly less, with a corresponding increase
in asset holdings. The Euler equations embody this indifference. In an equi-
librium, the representative household owns all ﬁrms, at (j) = 1.62 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Aggregate Output
The aggregate output, yt, is produced from the continuum of differentiated
inputs,yt (j), using a constant-elasticity-of-substitution production function
yt =





where θ ≥ 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between goods. This is the
Dixit-Stiglitz(1977)formulationusedbyBlanchardandKiyotaki(1987). Pro-
duction is competitive and given nominal prices, Pt (j), for the differentiated
inputs, cost minimization implies the following nominal price index/marginal
cost for the aggregate output
Pt =







Given aggregate output, the demand for a differentiated good is a function of
its relative price, pt (j) ≡ Pt (j)/Pt,
yt (j) = pt (j)
−θ yt. (10)
Aggregate output can be used for consumption or for the accumulation of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital by the producers of differentiated goods, xt (j). Market
clearingforgoodsimpliesthataggregateoutputequalsthesumofconsumption
and aggregate investment





The differentiated goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically
competitiveﬁrms,andthesearethesameﬁrmstowhichthehouseholdsupplies
labor. Thedifferentiatedgoodsareproducedusingtheinputscapitalandlabor,
both of which are speciﬁc to each ﬁrm. The differentiated ﬁrms can adjust the
nominal prices they set for their product only infrequently.
Production
Production is constant-returns-to-scale; in particular, we assume that the pro-
duction function is Cobb-Douglas:
yt (j) = kt (j)
α [Atht (j)]1−α ; (12)
yt (j) is ﬁrm j’s output in period t,and kt (j) and ht (j) are, respectively, the
capital input and labor input used by ﬁrm j in period t.There is an aggregate
productivity disturbance given by At. At the beginning of period t, ﬁrm j’s
capitalinputispredeterminedasaresultoftheinvestmentdecisionﬁrmj madeA. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 63
in period t − 1. Furthermore, there are convex costs of changing the capital
stock, which we will specify further below. Labor is hired in competitive
markets, but because households receive distinct disutility from the labor they
provide to each ﬁrm, the wage can differ across ﬁrms.6
In order to change its capital stock from kt in period t to kt+1 in period
t + 1, a ﬁrm needs xt units of the aggregate output good





The ﬁrm incurs capital adjustment costs determined by the increasing and
convex function, G(kt+1/kt). As inWoodford (2005), G(1) = δ,G  (1) = 1
and G   (1) =  ψ, where  ψ > 0 is a parameter. If the ﬁrm exactly replaces
depreciated capital, then the marginal investment cost is one, but if the ﬁrm
increases its capital stock, then the marginal cost of each additional unit of
capital is greater than one and increasing with the rate at which the capital
stock increases.
Prices
Firms in the model face limited opportunities for price adjustment. In partic-
ular, we assume that any ﬁrm faces an exogenous probability of adjusting its
price in period t and that the probability may depend on when the ﬁrm last
adjusted its price. The key notation describing limited price adjustment will
be a vector   (possibly with a countably inﬁnite number of elements); the sth
element of  , called φs, is the probability that a ﬁrm adjusts its price in period
t,conditional on its previous adjustment having occurred in period t − s.
There is a time invariant distribution of ﬁrms according to when they last
adjusted their price, since the price-adjustment probabilities do not vary with
time. Let ωs denote the fraction of ﬁrms in period t, charging prices set in
periods t − s, with the corresponding vector,  . Given the price-adjustment





ωs−1, for s = 1,2,..., and (14)




The most common pricing speciﬁcations in the literature are those ﬁrst
described by Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). Taylor’s speciﬁcation is one
of uniformly staggered price setting: every ﬁrm sets its price for J periods,
and at any point in time a fraction 1/J of ﬁrms charge a price set s peri-
ods ago. The J-element vector of adjustment probabilities for the Taylor
model is   = [0,...,0,1], and the J-element vector of fractions of ﬁrms is
6 Labor market clearing is implicitly imposed by not differentiating between the labor supplied
to the jth type of ﬁrm and the labor demanded by the jth type of ﬁrm.64 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
  = [1/J,1/J,...,1/J]. In contrast, Calvo’s speciﬁcation involves uncer-
tainty about when ﬁrms can adjust their price. No matter when a ﬁrm last
adjusted its price, it faces a probability φ of adjusting. Thus, the inﬁnite vec-
tor of adjustment probabilities is   = [φ,φ,...], and the inﬁnite vector of
fractions of ﬁrms is ωs = φ (1 − φ)
s ,s= 0,1,....
FirmValue
We assume that a ﬁrm pays out each period’s proﬁts as dividends to its share-
holders:
dt (j) = pt (j)yt (j) − wt (j)ht (j) − xt (j). (15)
Conditional on the ﬁrm’s relative price, pt (j), sales, yt (j), are determined
by the demand curve (10). The ﬁrm’s demand for labor is







The rationale behind solving for labor input in (16) is that in period t the
ﬁrm’s capital stock is predetermined, and thus the labor input it must employ
isdeterminedbyitstechnology,giventhelevelofdemand,yt (j). Conditional







Investment is determined by the capital stock the ﬁrm operates at the
beginning of the period and the capital stock the ﬁrm plans to operate in the
next period, equation (13). With some abuse of notation we can rewrite the
real dividends of a ﬁrm as a function of its idiosyncratic state and control
variables: the relative price and the beginning-of-period and end-of-period
capital stocks,
dt (j) = dt
 
pt (j),k t (j),k t+1 (j)
 
. (18)
The dependence on the aggregate state of the economy (aggregate demand,
productivity, wages) is subsumed in the time subscript t for the function d.









Let vt (p−1,k,j) denote the value of a ﬁrm with relative price, p−1,i n
the last period and beginning of period capital stock k. Let j denote when the
ﬁrm last adjusted its nominal price. If j = 0, the ﬁrm can adjust its nominal
price in the current period, that is, p−1 does not affect the ﬁrm’s value and weA. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 65
write vt (k,0). We can write the value of a ﬁrm as a function of its own state
variables recursively,




















   
, (20)
vt (pt−1,k t,j) = max
kt+1
 











vt+1 (pt,k t+1,j+ 1)
  
, (21)
and pt = pt−1
Pt−1
Pt
NotethatforCalvopricing,φj = φ,andthereforevt (p−1,k,1) = vt (p−1,k,j)
for all j ≥ 1. On the other hand, for Taylor pricing the ﬁrm value functions
are only deﬁned for j ≤ J − 1, since φJ = 1.
Government Policy
We assume that there is neither taxation nor government spending. Monetary
policy chooses a desired steady-state level for the inﬂation rate, π∗. Given the
steady-state real interest rate, 1/β, the steady-state nominal interest rate, i∗,
consistent with the inﬂation rate, π∗,i s




Monetary policy is assumed to set the period nominal interest rate in response
to deviations of the inﬂation rate and output from their respective steady-state
values,











2. THE CALVO MODEL




all these ﬁrms yields a consistent aggregation. We do not provide a complete
characterization of the equilibrium; for this we refer the reader to Woodford
(2005). Although our results below on equilibrium indeterminacy are for the
Taylormodel,wepresenttheequilibriumcharacterizationfortheCalvomodel66 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
because it helps to explain the appeal of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. It is only in the
zero-inﬂation Calvo model that one can solve for a simple NK Phillips curve
involving aggregate marginal cost and see how the coefﬁcient on marginal
cost depends on investment adjustment costs as well as price stickiness.
The crucial element of the procedure is that the approximation proceeds
aroundadeterministicsteadystatewhereallﬁrmsareidentical,sothatthelog-
linearized ﬁrst-order conditions are the same for all ﬁrms. This feature makes
it possible to derive a ﬁrst-order aggregation over ﬁrms that may temporarily
deviatefromthedeterministicsteadystate,andmaythereforebecharacterized
by ﬁrm-speciﬁc state variables, kt (j) and Pt (j).
Since ﬁrms differ only because they may or may not have the chance to
adjust their prices, there are only two possibilities for ﬁrms to be the same
in the steady state despite the fact that they do not all adjust their prices at
the same time. First, there is zero steady-state inﬂation. In this case there is
no need for ﬁrms to adjust their prices and they will all be the same anyway.
Second, there is indexation: if ﬁrms cannot adjust their price optimally to
theircurrentstate, theirpriceisneverthelessadjustedaccordingtotheaverage
inﬂation rate. Thus the ﬁrm’s relative price also does not change. In the
following we study the ﬁrst case, zero steady-state inﬂation.
To summarize, we study the log-linear approximation of an economy
with a deterministic steady state where all ﬁrms are identical. That is, we
have pss
t (j) = 1 and kss
t (j) = k∗.
Optimal CapitalAccumulation
Taking the ﬁrm’s price decision as given for the time being, optimal choices
of kt+1 (j) and xt (j) maximize the expectation of (19) subject to the ﬁrm’s
product demand function (10), capital adjustment costs (13), and demand for
labor (16).


































where ut+1 (j) denotes the value of having an additional unit of capital in
period t + 1. This value, u, is the marginal labor cost reduction from theA. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 67
additional capital:
ut+1 (j) =− wt+1 (j)
∂H
 







wt+1 (j)ht+1 (j)/kt+1 (j).
The Euler equation is somewhat complicated, but it embodies the fact that a
marginal increase in next period’s capital stock has three effects. It subtracts
fromresourcesavailableforcurrentconsumption;itaddstoresourcesavailable
for future consumption; and it reduces future labor costs.
We now derive the log-linear approximation of the ﬁrm’s Euler equation
for capital (24). Let ˆ x denote the percentage deviation of a variable from its
steady-state value x∗, ˆ x = dx/x∗. Because kss
t+1 (j)/kss
t (j) = 1, the log-
linear approximation of the Euler equation is
G   (1)
G  (1)
 





G   (1)
G  (1)
 
ˆ kt+2 (j) − ˆ kt+1 (j)
 
(26)
+[1 − β (1 − δ)] ˆ ut+1 (j) + ˆ λt+1 − ˆ λt
 
.
Note that G   (1)/G  (1) =  ψ. The log-linear approximation of the marginal
value of capital (24) is
ˆ ut+1 (j) =ˆ wt+1 (j) + ˆ ht+1 (j) − ˆ kt+1 (j). (27)
After substituting for ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor supply using (5), this equation can
be written as
ˆ ut+1 (j) =
 
ν ˆ ht+1 (j) − ˆ λt+1
 
+ ˆ ht+1 (j) − ˆ kt+1 (j). (28)
Next, substituting for the equilibrium employment from (16) and then substi-
tuting for ﬁrm j’s output using the demand function (10), we get the marginal
value of a unit of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital in terms of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables
(relative price and capital stock) and the aggregate variables (aggregate de-
mand, marginal utility, and technology):
ˆ ut+1 (j) =− θ
ν + 1
1 − α










ˆ yt+1 − ˆ λt − (ν + 1) ˆ At+1. (29)
Notice that the Euler-equation approximations (26) and (29) are the same
for all ﬁrms, independent of their idiosyncratic state. We can now aver-





ˆ kt (j)di (30)68 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
be the deviation of the aggregate capital stock from its steady-state value, and
similarly for all other variables. Aggregating over the ﬁrst-order conditions
(26) and (29), we have
 ψ
 




ˆ λt+1 − ˆ λt + β ψ
 
ˆ kt+2 − ˆ kt+1
 













−(ν + 1) ˆ At+1. (32)




ˆ pt (j)dj = 0. (33)
Now deﬁne a ﬁrm’s capital stock deviation from the aggregate deviation from
the steady state as
˜ kt (j) = ˆ kt (j) − ˆ kt (34)
and subtract the aggregate conditions (31) and (32) from the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
conditions (26) and (29) to yield
 ψ
 






˜ kt+2 (j) − ˜ kt+1 (j)
 
+{1 − β (1 − δ)} ˜ ut+1 (j)
 
, (35)
˜ ut+1 (j) =−
ν + 1
1 − α







˜ kt+1 (j). (36)
Note that (35) and (36) deﬁne an autonomous system for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
relative capital stock and relative price that is independent of aggregate vari-
ables. In order to complete this system, we need the expression for the un-
conditional expectation of the ﬁrm’s relative price in the next period. There
are two possibilities for next period’s relative price. First, with probability
1−φ, the ﬁrm will be unable to adjust its nominal price, and its relative price
declines with the aggregate inﬂation rate π. Second, with probability φ, the
ﬁrm can adjust its nominal price and the optimal relative price choice is ˆ p∗:
Et ˆ pt+1 (j) = (1 − φ)
 
ˆ pt (j) − Etπt+1
 
+ φEt ˆ p∗
t+1 (j). (37)
The analysis so far suggests that we can solve for the evolution of the
ﬁrm’srelativestatevariablesindependentlyoftheevolutionofaggregatestate
variables, but it also implies that optimal capital accumulation and optimal
price setting will interact.A. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 69
The Interaction of Price Setting and Capital
Accumulation
We ﬁrst show how aggregate inﬂation is related to the average price chosen
by all the ﬁrms that can adjust prices. Once we conjecture that a particular
price-adjusting ﬁrm’s deviation from this average optimal price depends only
on its relative capital stock, we can show how to solve for the evolution of
the ﬁrm’s relative capital stock. Conditional on the law of motion for the
ﬁrm’s optimal relative capital stock, one can then solve the ﬁrm’s optimal
price-settingproblem. Foranequilibrium,theconjectureontheoptimalprice-
setting rule in the ﬁrst step has to be consistent with the solution of the price-
setting problem in the second step. This second step involves quite a bit of
algebra, and we refer the reader to Woodford (2005) for the solution. We do
state the Phillips curve equation that follows from these steps. The form of
the Phillips curve illustrates the appeal of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital.
Aggregate Inﬂation
In the Calvo setup, aggregate inﬂation is determined as a weighted average of
the current distribution of relative prices and the optimal relative prices set by
price-adjusting ﬁrms. At the beginning of period t +1, a fraction 1−φ of all
ﬁrms keeps their price and a fraction φ adjusts their price conditional on their
state. For both groups we can use the unconditional distribution of all ﬁrms in
the economy. Thus, the deviation of the aggregate price level from the steady
state is
ˆ Pt+1 = (1 − φ)
  1
0




t (j)dj = (1 − φ) ˆ Pt +φ ˆ P ∗
t+1. (38)
Subtract ˆ Pt from both sides and the aggregate inﬂation rate is
πt+1 = ˆ Pt+1 − ˆ Pt = φ
 
ˆ P ∗
t+1 − ˆ Pt
 
. (39)
Adding and subtracting ˆ Pt+1 on the right-hand side and using the deﬁnition of
the inﬂation rate, we get the inﬂation rate proportional to the average optimal
relative price
(1 − φ)πt+1 = φ
 
ˆ P ∗
t+1 − ˆ Pt+1
 
= φ ˆ p∗
t+1. (40)
Usingexpression(40)fortheinﬂationrateinthedeﬁnitionofnextperiod’s
unconditional expected relative price (37) we get
Et ˆ pt+1 (j) = (1 − φ)
 








t ˆ pt+1 (j)
= (1 − φ) ˆ pt (j) + φEt
 
ˆ p∗
t+1 (j) −ˆ p∗
t+1
 
. (41)70 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Now assume that the deviation of a ﬁrm’s optimal relative price from the
average optimal relative price is a function of the ﬁrm’s relative state only:
ˆ p∗
t (j) =ˆ p∗
t − μ˜ kt (j). (42)
Then equations (35), (36), (41), and (42) deﬁne an autonomous system for
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc relative capital stock, ˜ k (j), and relative price, ˆ p(j), that is
independent of aggregate variables. We are interested in a recursive solution
to this system, that is, a solution such that the ﬁrm’s choice for next period’s
relative capital stock, ˜ kt+1 (j), is a function of its own relative state only,  
˜ kt (j), ˆ pt (j)
 
:
˜ kt+1 (j) =  ˜ kt (j) − τ ˆ pt (j). (43)
Optimal Price Setting
Woodford (2005) solves the optimal price-setting problem conditional on the
optimalcapitalaccumulationrule(43). Inparticular, theoptimalprice-setting
rule is shown to be of the form assumed in equation (42): the deviation of a
particular ﬁrm’s optimal relative price from the average optimal relative price,
ˆ p∗
t (i) −ˆ p∗
t , is a function of the ﬁrm’s relative state, ˜ kt (i). Woodford (2005)
shows how one can obtain the coefﬁcients  ,τ, and μ through the method of
undetermined coefﬁcients.
The solution of the optimal pricing problem yields an expression for the
average optimal price as a function of the average marginal labor cost of
production, ˆ st, and expected future optimal prices and inﬂation:
ˆ p∗
t =
1 − (1 − φ)β
 






where   is a coefﬁcient to be determined by the solution procedure. In partic-
ular,   will depend on the the price-adjustment probability φ and the degree


















ˆ kt + ˆ At
 
. (45)
We can now use again the expression for aggregate inﬂation in the Calvo
model in (40) and derive the “standard” New Keynesian Phillips curve
πt =
[1 − (1 − φ)β]φ
(1 − φ) 





For a simple Calvo model with no ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital,   = 1. Thus the
modiﬁed Calvo model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital adjustment costs generates
almost the same NK Phillips curve as the basic Calvo model, except for  .A. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 71
In particular, higher capital adjustment costs increase   and thereby reduce
the coefﬁcient on the marginal cost term. Woodford (2005) and Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2004) thus argue that a low estimated coefﬁcient on marginal cost
does not necessarily imply that the price-adjustment probability is very low;
it can also mean that the capital adjustment costs are very high.
3. THE TAYLOR MODEL
IntheTaylormodel, priceadjustmentoccurseveryJ periodsforanindividual
ﬁrm, and in any given period by a fraction 1/J of ﬁrms. Because there is no
uncertainty regarding when a ﬁrm will adjust its price, the state space does
not explode as it does in the Calvo model. Therefore, the Taylor model with
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital can be approximated easily around a steady state with
nonzero inﬂation. Here we present the exact equations of the model. We then
linearize them and compute the model’s local dynamics.
Pricing






























is the unconditional expectation operator—there is no uncertainty in the price




























yt+τ = 0, (48)
where st (j) is the ﬁrm’s marginal (labor) cost of production, (17). The ﬁrst-
order conditions for optimal capital accumulation are the same as in the Calvo
model, equations (25) and (26).72 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
To simplify (48) we will solve for the optimal price P ∗
t (j), at the same


































Next, note that P θ




























Until now we have carried around the ﬁrm’s index j, which lies in the interval
[0,1]. However with Taylor pricing, it is only necessary to keep track of J
differenttypesofﬁrms—anyﬁrmsthatsettheirpriceinthesameperiodbehave
identically. Of course, this is not the case in the Calvo model.7 Henceforth
the index j denotes the ﬁnite types J. For example, the marginal cost for a
ﬁrm that set its price in period t − j will be sj,t; the price in period t charged
by a ﬁrm that last set its price in period t − j will be Pj,t. Thus, instead of
P ∗











































and the demand equations are
yj,t = p
−θ
j,tyt,j = 0,1,...,J − 1. (53)




= wj,t,j = 0,1,...,J − 1. (54)
7 We could also study the Taylor model under the assumption that ﬁrms that set their price in
the same period have initial conditions that involve heterogeneous capital. Under this assumption,
there would be multiple prices chosen in the same period. However, as long as the size of the
initial state was manageable, it would be feasible to analyze such a situation.A. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 73
Investment and Labor Demand
Here, for convenience, we collect the equations that were stated in Section 1
forthegeneralmodelandtheequationsforoptimalcapitalaccumulationfrom
the Calvo model. We express these equations in a form speciﬁc to the Taylor





 1−α . (55)






The ﬁrst-order condition for next period’s capital stock depends on the stage
of the price cycle that a ﬁrm is in. To simplify notation, let “j + i” denote
(j + i)mod(J − 1) for j = 0,1,...,J − 1. For example for j = J − 2 and
i = 3, j + i = 2. The rewritten ﬁrst-order condition (24) for next period’s


























Real proﬁts in period t for ﬁrm j are given by
dj,t = pj,tyj,t − wj,thj,t − xj,t. (58)





4. RESULTS FOR THE TAYLOR MODEL
In this section we present results describing how the behavior of the Tay-
lor model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital varies with the steady-state inﬂation rate
around which it is linearized. We follow Sveen and Weinke’s (2005) analysis
of the Calvo model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc adjustment costs and zero steady-state
inﬂation. First, we report on the range of parameters for the monetary policy
rule and adjustment costs for which we can ﬁnd unique RE equilibria. This
range is sensitive to the steady-state inﬂation rate: higher inﬂation rates re-
duce the set of parameters for which there is a unique RE equilibrium. Next,
we compare impulse response functions to a productivity shock for zero and
moderate inﬂation. They differ, but not dramatically.
The model is parameterized as follows. We interpret a period as a quarter,
and set the discount factor, β = 0.99; the risk aversion parameter, σ = 2; the
inverse labor supply elasticity, ν = 1; the capital depreciation rate, δ = 0.03;
and the capital income share, α = 0.36. This is a standard parameterization.74 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
We set the investment adjustment cost parameter,  ψ = 3, as in Woodford
(2005). Based on evidence from aggregate data, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2005) suggest that this value represents a lower bound for adjustment costs.
Around a zero-inﬂation steady state, there is no need to specify the function
G(.) beyond the two parameters, δ and  ψ.Around steady states with nonzero









1 +  ψ
, (60)




time paths for current and future outcomes are possible. In other words, the
equilibrium is indeterminate. In this situation the path that is expected to
be chosen will occur, but many can be chosen. The choice of equilibrium
path then may depend on random shocks that are not fundamental to the
economy, that is, they do not constrain the set of resource-feasible allocations
in the economy. In these “sunspot” equilibria self-fulﬁlling expectations that
coordinate on the nonfundamental shocks introduce unnecessary ﬂuctuations
into the economy.8 Since the representative agent is risk-averse, she will
prefer a smooth consumption path relative to the same smooth consumption
path with some added mean zero random ﬂuctuations. This means that, in
general, “sunspot” equilibria are sub-optimal, and a good monetary policy
should not give rise to equilibrium indeterminacy.
Taylor (1993) proposed a monetary policy rule of the form fπ = 1.5
and fy = 0.125 based on the outcomes of model simulations.9 This policy
rule reﬂects the Taylor principle that monetary policy should increase nomi-
nal interest rates more than one-for-one for any increase of inﬂation. In basic
sticky-price models with reasonable speciﬁcations of price rigidity and with-
out capital, this principle will, in general, imply a unique RE equilibrium.
Sveen and Weinke (2005) evaluate the role of the policy parameter, fπ, and
the degree of price stickiness, φ, for the existence of unique RE equilibria in
the Calvo model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. They show that as the degree of
price stickiness increases, the set of policy parameters for which there is local
uniqueness becomes smaller. For the Taylor model we provide an analog to
8 For a textbook treatment of sunspot equilibria, see, for example, Farmer (1993).
9 Taylor (1993) writes the policy rule for annual data, thus his fy = 0.5 coefﬁcient on output
deviations translates to 0.125 = 0.5/4 in our quarterly model. Taylor’s proposed policy rule has
also spawned an empirical literature that tries to estimate whether actual monetary policy conforms
to some version of this policy rule, for example, Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (2000).A. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 75
their results (price stickiness is now represented by J). We also study the
impact of the steady-state inﬂation rate, π, and investment adjustment costs,
 ψ, on equilibrium indeterminacy. We ﬁnd that local uniqueness becomes
less likely for higher inﬂation rates. Depending on the degree of price stick-
iness, high or low values of the adjustment cost parameter  ψ can lead to
indeterminacy.
In Figure 1, we plot several graphs in (π,fπ)-space that represent the
border between indeterminacy and uniqueness for a policy rule that does not
respond to output, fy = 0. We present this information in two panels because
for very low values of fπ, it is not possible to convey the relevant information
unless the fπ-axis scale is very ﬁne. The inﬂation rate, π, is the rate of price
change from one period to the next, and since a period represents a quarter, a
gross inﬂation rate of 1.01 represents a 4 percent annual inﬂation rate. Each
graph corresponds to a different value of J. In the top panel of Figure 1,
which corresponds to relatively high values of fπ, the region of equilibrium
indeterminacy (uniqueness) for an economy with price stickiness, J,i sb e -
tween the graph and the southeast (northwest) corner of the ﬁgure. There is
no graph for J = 2 in the top panel because uniqueness holds everywhere in
the ﬁgure when J = 2. The bottom panel, corresponding to low values of fπ,
is less straightforward: for J = 2 there is indeterminacy below the graph; for
J = 3,4 and 5 there is indeterminacy generally below and to the right of the
graphs.
We ﬁnd that for moderate steady-state inﬂation, if prices are ﬁxed for
more than two periods then policy needs to respond to inﬂation signiﬁcantly
more than one-to-one in order for the RE equilibrium to be unique. First, for
all values of J and π that we consider, equilibrium is indeterminate if fπ is
less than approximately 1.01 (the precise number varies with J and π), as
seen in the lower panel of Figure 1. In contrast, for the Calvo model with zero
inﬂation,SveenandWeinke(2005)ﬁndthatthereisaneighborhoodoffπ = 1
such that equilibrium is unique. Second, for ﬁxed degrees of price stickiness,
J>2, the policy response fπ required to maintain a unique equilibrium can
become quite large as we increase the steady-state inﬂation rate, as seen in the
upper panel of Figure 1. This occurs even though the steady-state inﬂation
ratesthatweconsideraremoderate, lessthan4percentperyear. Forexample,
if prices are ﬁxed for three periods, around a zero-inﬂation steady state there
is a unique equilibrium if fπ  1.02; in contrast, around a 4 percent inﬂation
steady state there is a unique equilibrium only if fπ  1.73. The sensitivity
to steady-state inﬂation becomes more extreme for higher degrees of price
stickiness. If prices are ﬁxed for four periods, around a zero-inﬂation steady
state there is a unique equilibrium if fπ ∈ {(1.02,1.074) ∪ (1.47,∞)}; in
contrast, arounda4percentinﬂationsteadystatethereisauniqueequilibrium
only if fπ  5.29. Finally, for a given steady-state inﬂation rate, the region of76 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 The Monetary Policy Response to Inﬂation and Equilibrium
Indeterminacy
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indeterminacy is increasing in the degree of price rigidity. This is consistent
with Sveen and Weinke (2005, Figure 1).A. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 77
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Forsteady-stateinﬂationratesthatareevenmoderatelyhigh,theREequi-
librium tends to be indeterminate for a wide range of values of the adjustment
cost parameter,  ψ, but the precise relationship is sensitive to the degree of
price stickiness. In Figure 2 we graph the borders between indeterminacy and
uniqueness in (π, ψ)-space for different values of price stickiness J and a
policy rule with fπ = 1.5 and fy = 0. For parameter combinations between
a graph and the left (right) border of the ﬁgure, the RE equilibrium is locally
unique (indeterminate) for J = 3 and J = 4 (there is also a region of unique-
ness near  ψ = 0 for J = 4). For J = 5 there is indeterminacy (uniqueness)
above (below) the graph. For J = 2 there is uniqueness across the entire
ﬁgure. For J = 3 and J = 4 the region of indeterminacy is increasing in
the steady-state inﬂation rate. However, as the inﬂation rate increases, for
J = 3 indeterminacy ﬁrst appears at high values of  ψ, whereas for J = 4
indeterminacy ﬁrst appears at low values of  ψ.
Sveen and Weinke (2005) argue that if a monetary policy rule responds
notonlytotheinﬂationratebutalsotooutput,thenitismorelikelythattheRE
equilibriumisunique. IndeedtheTaylorrule(1993)speciﬁesthecoefﬁcienton
output as 0.125. In Figure 3 we graph the borders between indeterminacy and
uniqueness in (π,fπ)-space for different values of the coefﬁcient on output78 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly










































π Gross Quarterly Inflation Rate 
in the policy rule fy and ﬁxed price stickiness J = 4. For parameter com-
binations between a graph and the left (right) border of the ﬁgure, the RE
equilibrium is locally unique (indeterminate). Again, as the steady-state in-
ﬂation rate increases, it becomes more likely that the RE equilibrium is not
locally unique. For ﬁxed steady-state inﬂation, the RE equilibrium is unique
ifthepolicyresponsetooutputissufﬁcientlylarge. Thisconﬁrmstheﬁndings
of Sveen and Weinke (2005). Note, however, that even for moderate steady-
state inﬂation, it takes a large coefﬁcient on output to generate determinacy
in a rule that includes the standard Taylor coefﬁcient, fy = 0.125, on output.
For example, for annual inﬂation of 4 percent (corresponding to π = 1.01
in Figure 3), the coefﬁcient on inﬂation needs to be greater than 2 in order
to maintain a unique RE equilibrium. This is substantially more than the 1.5
value suggested by Taylor.
Theoverallmessageoftheseﬁguresisthatwhentheaverageinﬂationrate
is even moderately high—say, above 3.5 percent annually—the coefﬁcient on
inﬂation must be large relative to conventional values such as Taylor’s 1.5i n
order to generate a unique RE equilibrium.A. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 79

























4 12 8 16 20 24 0
4 12 8 16 20 24 0
4 12 8 16 20 24 0


























Figure 4 plots the response of several of the model’s aggregate variables to a
white noise productivity shock. We set J = 4 and fπ = 5.5. The solid lines
correspond to a steady state of zero inﬂation, and the dashed lines correspond80 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
to a steady state of 4 percent annual inﬂation. The responses to a produc-
tivity shock differ somewhat across very low and moderate inﬂation, but the
differences are not dramatic, and they essentially disappear after the impact
period. Given our ﬁndings about indeterminacy in Figures 1 and 2, it may
seem surprising that the impulse responses do not differ more across steady-
state inﬂation rates. There is, however, a good explanation for this. Unlike
a crossing from uniqueness to nonexistence, a crossing from uniqueness to
multiplicity need not be “foreshadowed” by large changes in the model’s dy-
namics. As we change a model’s parameters and uniqueness disappears, the
solution we were tracking does not vanish—it is simply complemented with
other solutions.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Sveen and Weinke (2004) and Woodford (2005) have made important contri-
butions in showing how one can linearly approximate the Calvo sticky-price
model when capital is tied to the individual ﬁrm. Their work shows that
capital adjustment costs at the ﬁrm level are complementary to price sticki-
ness in generating a small coefﬁcient on marginal cost in the New Keynesian
Phillips curve. Around a steady state with nonzero inﬂation, it is not (yet)
known how to approximate the Calvo model with ﬁrm-level investment; in
such a steady state there would be heterogeneity in both prices and capi-
tal stocks. Much recent empirical work on the NK Phillips Curve has used
data which is inconsistent with the zero-inﬂation approximation, so we would
like to have some means of evaluating the generality of results from the zero-
inﬂationcase. IntheTaylorsticky-pricemodelitisstraightforwardtoincorpo-
rate ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital even with nonzero steady-state inﬂation. Comparing
zero- and moderate (4 percent) rates of steady-state inﬂation, one ﬁnds that if
there is a locally unique equilibrium, quantitatively the model’s dynamics are
notverysensitivetotherateofinﬂation. ThisisconsistentwiththeworkofAs-
cari(2004),whoﬁndsthatthedynamicsofthebasicTaylormodel(i.e.,without
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital) are relatively insensitive to average inﬂation, in compar-
ison to the Calvo model. However, we ﬁnd that the range of parameter values
for which the model has a locally unique equilibrium is extremely sensitive to
even small changes in steady-state inﬂation—for example going from zero to
4 percent annual inﬂation causes a dramatic increase in the size of the param-
eter space for which there is local indeterminacy. The ability to deal with
nonzero inﬂation in the Taylor model points toward the value of conducting
empirical work on the New Keynesian Phillips curve in the Taylor model
framework. See Guerrieri (forthcoming) for an important step in this direc-A. Hornstein andA. Wolman: Trend Inﬂation 81
tion.10 However, the sensitivity of the local equilibrium uniqueness to the
average inﬂation rate presents obstacles to further empirical progress.
10 Cogley and Sbordone (2005) is an important example of empirical work on the Phillips
curve that allows for the possibility of nonzero steady-state inﬂation. They use a Calvo model
with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital but without ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment.82 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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